基于合作博弈的区域电力市场中消纳弃风激励机制研究

Incentive mechanism research on accommodation of wind power in regional electricity market based on cooperative game

随着我国风电装机容量的快速增长,风电弃风现象也日趋严重,其主要原因是电网调峰能力严重不足。针对调峰能力有限的区域电网,研究了如何协调风电和火电的利益关系,如何调动火电机组潜在的调峰能力问题。通过引入风火合作博弈的思想,在考虑风电和火电企业利益最大化的原则下,比较了风火联合参与市场交易和独立参与市场交易下,发电企业所获得的利益大小。结果表明,风火联合运营更能增加发电企业整体收益;通过引入火电避让积极性、风电上网积极性、降低成本的积极性和单位价值贡献率等因素,建立了风火企业共生模型,对增加的收益的分配问题给出了最优解,为促进风电和火电积极参与合作和联合市场交易模式提供了理论基础。

With the rapid development of China＇s installed capacity of wind power, the phenomenon of wind curtailment is getting worse mainly because of the serious shortage of power peaking capacity. Aiming at limited peaking capacity of regional power grid, it is studied that to coordinate the interest relationship between wind power and thermal power in order to mobilize the potential thermal power units peaking capacity. By introducing an idea of cooperative game of wind ＆ thermal power and considering a principle that maximizes benefits of wind power and thermal power enterprises, benefits power generation companies gained in the situations of wind ＆ thermal power participating in market transactions are compared with that in the situations of companies independently participating in market transactions. The results show that the wind ＆ thermal power joint operations are better than single operation. A symbiotic model of wind farm ＆ thermal power plant is built to give the most optimal solution to the allocation of increased interests by introduction of enthusiasm of thermal power avoidance, enthusiasm of wind power integration into grid, enthusiasm of reducing costs, unit value contribution rate and other factors, which provides a theoretical basis for promoting cooperation and joint market model of wind power and thermal power.