对现象保守主义的反驳是自我击败的吗?

Are the rejections of Phenomenal Conservatism self-defeating?

由迈克·胡摩尔所提出的现象保守主义,是当代知识论中最新的关于基础信念的确证理论之一,并迅速影响到了关于道德直觉和宗教信念的认知研究当中。现象保守主义认为,如果某种情况对主体S看起来是P,那么在缺乏击败者的情况下,S至少在某种程度上有理由地(确证地)相信P;并且如果反对现象保守主义,将会陷入一种自我击败的境地。胡摩尔关于"反现象保守主义是自我击败的"的论证如果能够成立,将对诸多知识论学说提出严重挑战,因此引起了众多的反响。本文将集中于这一论证过程以及对它的分析,并指出其中所存在的问题。

Phenomenal Conservatism, which proposed by Michael Huemer, is one of the newest justification theories in contemporary epistemology, and it has spread to the epistemic research on moral intuitions and religious beliefs in a short time. According to Phenomenal Conservatism, if it seems to S that P, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that P. What＇s more, if any other claim attempts to reject Phenomenal Conservatism, it will be doomed to self-defeat. Supposing that Huemer＇s argument is tenable, it will be a serious challenge to many other epistemologlcal theories. Consequently, this argument has raised many responses. This paper will focus on the process of the argumentation, and analyze it, find out its problem.