外部盈利压力会导致企业投资不足吗?——基于中国制造业上市公司的数据分析

Does External Earnings Pressure Influence Under- investment Behavior?——Evidence from the Listed Manufacturing Companies in China

本文以2007-2012年中国制造业上市公司为研究样本,考察了外部盈利压力影响企业投资不足的作用机制,并从监督和激励双重视角进一步探索分析师关注度和经理自由裁量权在两者关系间的调节作用。研究结果表明:第一,比较于经理人的经营期望,资本市场对企业经营期望越高,经理人所感知的外部盈利压力越大,越倾向于投资不足;第二,分析师关注度和经理自由裁量权对解决由外部盈利压力而产生的企业投资不足问题具有一定的监督和激励作用,比较于分析师关注度和经理自由裁量权低的公司,在分析师关注度和经理自由裁量权高的公司中,外部盈利压力对企业投资不足的影响均有所减弱,结果表明分析师关注度有利于降低投资者与公司之间的信息不对称,增强了对经理人投资行为决策的监督;同时,赋予经理人一定自由裁量权能有效地激励经理人在外部盈利压力下按照自身意愿制定和实施投资决策。

By analysis the data of the listed manufacturing companies in China from 2007 to 2012,this study examines the effect of pressure felt by management to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts on firms' under-investment behaviors. We make the following conclusions. First,firms under such earnings pressure tend to make under-investment choice. Second,analyst coverage and managerial discretion weaken the positive relationship between earnings pressure and under-investment. Analyst coverage can serve as an external monitoring mechanism to help contain this agency problem. Managers in high-discretion contexts are able to choose from a wide range of strategic options and have an important impact on organizational outcomes.