作为政策工具的国有企业与国企改革:基于预算软约束的视角

State-Owned Enterprises as Policy Instruments and SOE Reform: Perspective of Soft Budget Constraint

本文基于一个扩展的预算软约束模型,研究国有企业承担政府职能以后的预算软约束和道德风险问题,以及政府面临这些问题的最优对策。本文认为,预算软约束和道德风险等国企问题的出现,是政府主动追求非经济性的政策收益的结果;而政府愿意对国有企业进行实质性的市场化改革,则是因为这些企业不能为政府提供有价值的政策收益。因此,我国上一轮国有企业改革,实际上是政府调整非经济性的政策收益和预算软约束、道德风险等国企问题之间平衡关系的过程。基于此视角,我们可以对一边是"国退民进"另一边却是"国进民退"、一边是市场化改革另一边是央企垄断地位不断强化这些看似互相矛盾的国企改革现象给出一个统一而且内部逻辑一致的解释,并对我国下一轮国有企业改革方向提供有价值的思考。

Based on an extended model of soft budget constraint,this paper researched the problems of soft budget constraint and moral hazard in state-owned enterprises burdened with government goals,and how the government would counter these SOE problems. According to our research,SOE problems originate from the government’s motivation to pursue political benefit,and marketed-oriented reform of SOE begins only when these enterprises failed to provide the government with political benefit. Therefore,the essence in the last round of SOE reform in China was to balance against SOE problems when the government pursued political benefit from state-owned enterprises. From this perspective,we could give a uniform and logically consistent explanation for many seemly contradictory phenomena in the process of China’s SOE reform.