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涉农贷款、货币政策和违约风险 被引量:31

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摘要 本文运用某国有银行2002~2009年的企业借款数据,采用线性概率模型和非线性Logit模型,研究了涉农贷款违约以及货币政策和贷款违约之间的关系。本文发现,涉农贷款违约概率显著高于非涉农贷款,而且一旦涉农贷款违约,贷款形态的变迁速度较普通贷款更怏,涉衣贷款违约存在显著的行业效应。本文用基准利率作为货币政策的代理指标分析发现,货币政策对银行体系的贷款违约风险有直接的影响,而且,基准利率的变化对涉农贷款违约的影响大于对非涉农贷款违约的影响。从涉农贷款违约的影响因素来看,贷款期限、担保方式等贷款合约条款,以及企业规模、所有制类型、管理特征等因素,都对涉衣贷款违约有重要影响。本文还发现,涉农贷款的违约风险可能不是来自农业生产环节的自然风险,而是主要来自农业服务、加工和流通环节的市场风险。因此,在发放涉农贷款时,金融机构既需要关注借款者的风险特征,也需要合理设计贷款合约,还需要关注农产品的市场风险;在制定货币政策时,决策者要考虑货币政策对贷款违约的潜在影响。
出处 《中国农村经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第3期14-26,共13页 Chinese Rural Economy
基金 国家自然科学基金一般项目"流动性约束与中国家庭金融行为"(编号:71373213) 中央组织部青年拔尖人才支持计划 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划 中央高校基本科研业务经费专项资金的资助
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参考文献27

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二级参考文献55

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