证券投资者的进化博弈模型建立及渐进均衡研究

The Establishment of the Evolutionary Game Model with Security Investors and the Dynamic Equilibrium Studies

运用进化博弈相关理论,以我国证券市场中的理性和非理性投资者为局中人建立进化博弈单群体模型,并求解此单群体模型的渐进稳定均衡策略,得到理性与非理性投资者的渐进稳定均衡比例,得出理性交易策略与噪声交易策略应同时存在而且适度的噪声有利于保持市场的流动性的结论,为我国证券市场和政府监管者提出政策性建议.

The article will apply the the evolutionary game theory and build the single- population model with the rational and irrational investors in our security market being the players. Pursuiting the asymptotically stable strategy of the model, we obtain the asymptot- ically stable ratio of the rational and irrational investors and acquire the conclusion that the rational and irrational strategies should be compatible and the moderate noise is beneficial for the flowability of the market, by which we can give suggestions about policy to the market and government..