摘要
以我国A股上市公司为研究样本,通过构建多元回归模型来考察债务融资的治理效应。实证结果表明,目前我国上市公司的债务治理效应遭到严重扭曲,债务融资不能很好地发挥激励约束作用;在内部治理的各因素中,最终控制人性质、股权集中度、经理人激励程度对债务治理效应的发挥有显著的影响,董事会独立性与勤勉程度、监事会监督力度对债务治理效应发挥的影响不显著;内部控制对债务治理效应发挥的作用非常有限。根据研究结论,提出了强化我国上市公司债务治理效应的一些建议。
This paper builds some muhiple regression models to research the corporate governance effects of debts by using Chinese listed companies' empirical data. The empirical results show that corporate governance effects of debts are severely distorted. In addition, among different corporate internal governance factors, the char- acter of rulers, ownership concentration and managers' incentive have a significant influence to the corporate gov- ernance effects of debts, but the independance and diligence of board of directors have a limited influence. Be- sides, internal contorl only has a limitde influence to the effects. According to the empirical results, this paper gives some suggestions to enhance the corporate governance effects of debts.
出处
《经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第4期75-80,129,共7页
On Economic Problems
基金
教育部人文社科规划基金项目(11YJA630154)
关键词
内部治理
股权集中度
经理人激励
内部控制
债务治理效应
internal governance
internal contorl
ownership concentration
managers ' incentive
corporategovernance effects of debts