内部控制政府监管、审计介入与会计信息可靠性

Internal Control Regulation,Audit Intervention and Accounting Reliability

财务报告内部控制的监管成本有可能对会计信息的可靠性产生负向影响。内部控制的政府监管提高了会计信息的可靠性,但是监管成本不容忽视:内部控制基础薄弱者被动参与并追求短期行为导致盈余质量下降,基础较好者盈余质量虽有提高但却无法忽视初始监管成本的影响,因而质量增长幅度较小;审计在报告终点的介入以隐性激励的方式帮助政府管制实现外部成本内部化,提高了信息可靠性;强制审计用审计结果甄别和审计质量甄别替代市场甄别机制,公司对审计者的选择会影响投资者对信息质量的判断,从而导致审计市场的进一步集中。

This paper empirically analyzes the regulated firms＇ data and reveals the impact of regulation on accounting reliability. The result indicates that regulation helps to promote accounting reliability, but the cost of regulation cannot be ignored. The firms which have a weak internal control foundation and seek for short-term behaviors will result in the reduction of earning quality, and those which have a better foundation but can not ignore the influence of regulation costs will have a small-scale increase of earning quality; audit helps external costs become internalized with implicit incentive, and mandatory audit weakens market dis- crimination and substitutes it with audit result discrimination and audit quality discrimination. The firms＇ choice of auditors may impact investors＇ evaluation of earning quality, and lead to the further concentration of audit markets.