权力配置、问责与地方政府食品安全监管履职:争论与检验

Power Allocation,Accountability and Local Government Food Safety Regulation:Debate and Empirical Test

食品安全监管问责失效了吗?现有研究中存在一个隐含的理论假设:分段监管体制下问责失效使得地方政府缺乏积极履行职责的动力。主流文献认为,这是食品安全监管无效的主要原因。理论界据此提出食品安全监管体制从分散到集中的改革建议,以此为依据的改革实践也在不同层面展开。然而该假设并未得到实证检验,理论上也仍有争议。论文首先梳理出该假设及其影响,以及与之相关联的争议。然后,运用问卷调查数据进行实证检验。通过对地方政府食品安全监管治理模式进行区分,本研究发现,尽管食品安全日常监管问责失效,但事件管理问责并未失效。此外,控制权的纵向配置及监管权力的横向配置都对激励效力产生影响。这一发现具有重要的理论和政策含义。

There is an implicit theoretical hypothesis in food safety regulation research that accountability can't stimulate local governments to perform their duties actively in a fragmented regulatory system. This is believed to be a major cause of ineffective food safety regulation. Relying on this theory,reformation of the food safety regulatory system through centralization is currently proposed,and the reformation of practices at different levels of government have been launched. However, this hypothesis is still controversial,and has not been tested empirically. Firstly,this article teases out the hypothesis,its influence and the controversy surrounding it. Then,the hypothesis is tested with questionnaire data. By differentiating the governance structures of local governments' food safety regulation,this research finds that the implicit hypothesis is confirmed in day- to- day regulation but not as pertains to incident management. This finding has great implications for both theory and practice.