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风险投资联合投资对上市公司盈余管理的影响:基于我国创业板的实证研究 被引量:5

The Effect of Venture Capital Syndicate on Earnings Management of IPO Firms:Based on Empirical Study of GEM
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摘要 风险投资在中国的经济发展中处于越来越重要的位置,创业板355家上市公司中,近60%的公司有风险投资背景,近40%的公司有联合风投背景.本文首先以2009-2012年创业板355家上市公司为研究对象,实证研究了风险投资个数与盈余管理之间的关系,然后,以132家联合风投背景公司为研究对象,实证研究联合风投内部特征对IPO公司盈余管理的影响,试图探讨能够发挥最佳监督作用的联合投资方式.实证结果显示有风投背景公司的盈余管理程度高于无风投背景的公司,且联合风投个数越多,上市公司盈余管理程度越高.尽管如此,可以通过选择适当的联合投资方式降低联合投资的负面效应,比如:提高联合风投多样化程度、提高主导风投持股比例、选择高声誉主导风投等等. Venture capital is becoming more and more important in Chinese economy. Of 355 GEM listed companies, nearly 60% has venture capital background,and nearly 40% has venture capital syndicate background. This paper investigated the relationship between venture capital number and pre-IPO earnings management using a sample of 355 IPO firms in China GEM market during October 2009 and December 2012. Then, this paper investigated the effect of venture capital internal fea- tures on earnings management using a sample of 132 multi VC backed companies, trying to explore the best way to play a su- pervisory role in VC syndicate. The empirical results indicate that IPO firms in China GEM have earnings management behav- ior, and the degree of earnings management of VC backed firms is higher than non-VC backed firms, and the more the VC syn- dicate number, the higher the degree of earnings management. Nevertheless, we can choose the appropriate way to reduce the negative effects, such as increasing the degree of VC syndicate diversification, increasing the shareholding percent of leading VC, and choosing a more reputational leading VC etc.
作者 张莉 谈毅
出处 《经济数学》 2014年第1期41-47,共7页 Journal of Quantitative Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71173146) 上海市哲学社会科学项目(2011BJB008)
关键词 风险投资联合投资 盈余管理 IPO Venture capital syndicate earnings management IPO
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