论胡塞尔先验现象学作为独立的“第一哲学”范式

Husserlian Transcendental Phenomenology as a Distinct Paradigm of " First Philosophy"

在亚里士多德首先提出“第一哲学”概念之后，笛卡尔与胡塞尔各有以“第一哲学”为题的著作。他们的“第一哲学”具有各不相同的意蕴，分别代表了第一哲学的三种范式。但是，在关于它们之相互关系的讨论中，胡塞尔的先验现象学被置于比较尴尬的境地：论者往往忽视它的独特性，而将之归并到另外两种范式中，特别是阿佩尔（K-O．Apel）与列维纳斯（E．Levinas）各执一端，

In his lectures First Philosohpy(1923/24),Husserl justifies transcendental phenomenology as first philosophy.In this paper,we will delineate that transcendental phenomenology,only by means of its special methods of eidetic intuition and transcendental reduction,can be justified as so-called universal and absolute science.In our opinion,Husserlian paradigm of first philosophy deserves to be distinct from Aristotelian and Cartesian ones.Furthermore,we argue that some scholars such as K.-O.Apel and E.Levinas do not quite realize the significances of transcendental phenomenology for the history of problem of first philosophy,when they describe it as radicalization of Cartesian or Aristotelian first philosophy.