期刊文献+

林木拍卖中的企业合谋问题研究——基于锦屏县林木拍卖数据的分析

Studies on the Collusion among Enterprise of Trees Auction ——Analysis based on the trees auction of Jinping County
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摘要 为了找出影响企业对林木估价的因素以及探寻林木拍卖中企业合谋检测的方法,应用定性分析与定量分析相结合的方法对锦屏县林木拍卖中企业合谋问题进行研究。通过定性分析找出影响企业对林木估价的因素,然后将拍卖中企业的估价作为被解释变量,将影响企业估价的因素作为解释变量,建立回归模型。结果显示:部分区域的林木拍卖中存在以轮流做庄为方式的竞买企业间的合谋现象。针对存在的问题,提出减少林木拍卖交易中不必要的中间环节、进行相应的综合配套改革、鼓励地区之间林业企业的流动、建立林业企业行业协会组织、加大查处惩罚力度等建议。 To detect collusion among bidders in trees auction and find the influential factors of collusion in trees auction, data of trees auction in Jinping County Guizhou Province were selected and methods of qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis were used. The influential factors of collusion in trees auction were found with methods of the quantitative analysis and the literature analysis. Then establish econometric model with auction bid as explained variable, and with trees characteristics, supply and demand of trees, policy and system as independent variables. The conclusion was that there was collusion among bidders in this way of take turns to win the trees auction. Based on the ex- isting problems, there are some suggestions were put forward.
出处 《林业经济问题》 北大核心 2013年第6期497-502,共6页 Issues of Forestry Economics
基金 粮农组织-国家林业局-欧盟资助课题(GCP-CPR-038)
关键词 锦屏县 林木拍卖 合谋 检测 Jinping County trees auction collusion detection
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