区域环境治理的企业参与机制研究

Enterprise Cooperation Mechanism for Regional Environmental Governance

构建完全信息静态博弈模型,分析无政府干预条件下企业参与区域环境治理的囚徒困境,探究基于市场的激励机制和基于自觉的承诺机制对企业参与水平的影响。结果表明,基于市场的激励机制可在一定程度上提高企业的参与水平,但政府成本较高,基于自觉的承诺机制可以较低成本实现企业参与区域环境治理的帕累托最优。

This paper formulates a game theoretical model to analyze the Prisoner＇s Dilemma situation for enterprises participating in regional environmental governance without governmentlntervention. Then, we raise marketbased incentives and conscious commitment mechanism, and explore their effects on the cooperation level of enterprises. The results show that market-based incentives may improve the level of cooperation to some extent, but will bring a higher cost of government; the conscious commitment mechanism can achieve Pareto optimal for enterprises participating in regional environmental governance with a lower cost.