基于政企双主体动态博弈模型的中小企业技术创新问题分析

The Game Model Analysis of SMEs' Technological Innovation Based on the Principal-agent Theory

以信息经济学中的委托代理理论为基础,构建了一个政企双主体动态博弈模型,研究政府与中小企业创新激励之间的理论关系。在此基础上,着重分析了政府的利益偏好、中小企业创新行为的不确定性以及道德风险等因素对激励中小企业进行技术创新的影响,从而得出政府在激励中小企业积极进行技术创新时,要努力降低中小企业的边际成本,保证其经济效益;同时还要健全相关的法律法规,降低技术创新外部环境的不确定性等结论。最后综合上述博弈模型的分析,提出促进中小企业技术创新的针对性建议。

This paper builds a double main body dynamic game model about government and enterprises to study the theory of innovation incentive relationship between the government and small and medium- sized enterprise based on the theory of principal- agent of information economics. On this basis,this paper analyzes the government＇s interest preference,uncertainty of small and medium- sized enterprise innovation behavior and moral risk factors such as the impact on the motivation of technological innovation in small and medium-sized enterprises. As a result,it is concluded that the government trys to reduce the marginal cost of small and medium- sized enterprises to improve its economic benefits,improve the relevant laws and regulations at the same time,and reduce the uncertainty of the external environment of technological innovation,etc. Finally, combined with the analysis of the model,Suggestions of promoting SMEs＇ technological innovation are put forward to promoting SMEs in technological innovation.