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声誉激励、社会监督与质量规制——城市垃圾处理行业中的博弈分析 被引量:25

Reputation Incentive,Social Supervision and Quality Regulation——Game Analysis in the Waste Disposal Industry
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摘要 我国实施市政公用事业市场化改革以来,民营企业通过竞标等方式从政府手中获取特许经营权,凭借其垄断地位和信息优势降低服务标准,导致垃圾处理行业陷入质量规制的困境。本文针对城市垃圾处理行业的问题,先是构建以规制机构与垃圾处理特许经营企业为参与者的博弈模型,分析了声誉激励和社会监督对博弈参与双方损益及其策略的影响;然后构建纳入举报机制的由社会民众、规制机构和特许经营企业三方参与的序列博弈模型。研究得出四点结论:(1)减少规制成本,增加对违规垃圾处理企业的惩罚力度,可减少企业违规概率;(2)声誉激励和社会监督均可减少垃圾处理特许经营企业违规概率;(3)社会监督有助于节约规制成本,减弱规制机构与企业间信息不对称程度,提高规制效率;(4)规制机构的检查行为与公众举报行为之间存在明显的互补性。最后针对性地提出了提高城市垃圾处理行业质量规制效果的政策建议。 Since China's implementation of market- oriented reforms in the municipal utility industry, municipal solid waste industry has gradually opened to the market. Private enterprises obtain the franchise from the government through competitive bidding,and become the regional monopoly producer of the waste disposal service. Driven by its private interests,private enterprises reduce the quality of service,damage the social welfare by virtue of its monopoly position and information superiority,which led to the quality regulation in the municipal solid waste disposal industry fall into a dilemma. Faced with the serious problem of the quality regulation in the waste disposal industry,this article constructs the model of game theory between regulatory agency and the waste disposal franchise enterprises,deeply analyzes the impacts of reputation incentive and social supervision to the game participators' gains and losses,and its strategy. Mean well,this article constructs a sequence game model embedded the reporting mechanism with the participators such as the community,regulatory agency and the waste disposal franchise enterprises,then the conclusion is that:( 1) Reducing regulatory costs and increasing punishment can reduce the probability of the franchise enterprises' violation;( 2) Both reputation incentive and social supervision can reduce the probability of the franchise enterprises' violation;( 3) Social supervision can reduce the regulatory cost,weaken the information asymmetry between the regulatory agency and the waste disposal franchise enterprises,thereby,can increase the efficiency quality regulation;( 4) There is a clear complementarity between the inspect of the regulatory agency and people' s report. At last,this article raises policy suggestions improving the effect of quality regulation in Waste disposal industry.
出处 《产经评论》 CSSCI 2014年第2期93-106,共14页 Industrial Economic Review
基金 国家社科基金重大招标项目"中国城市公用事业政府监管体系创新研究"(项目批准号:12&ZD211 主持人:王俊豪) 国家自然科学基金青年项目"外部干预政策对公众消费碳减排的影响效应和作用机理"(项目批准号:71203192 主持人:王建明)
关键词 城市垃圾处理行业 质量规制 声誉激励 社会监督 博弈分析 waste disposal industry quality regulation reputation incentive social supervision game analysis
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