虚拟平台中智慧城市信息转移演化博弈分析

The Analysis of Evolutionary Game on Smart City Information Transfer in Virtual Platform

在新一代信息技术支撑下的智慧城市中,构建信息化资源共享的虚拟平台成为其信息转移和共享的有效途径。因此文章分析了信息作为生产要素在农业时代、工业时代、信息时代、智慧时代的表现形式及转移虚拟平台构建的必要性。在信息传递主体有限理性的情况下,将演化博弈理论引入到信息转移过程中形成政府与信息主体的收益矩阵,并研究虚拟平台在官管民营模式下,信息转移过程中资源主体和政府的复制动态方程及稳定状态点现实解释。用复制动态相位图表示政府和信息资源主体在转移共享和激励行为比例变化的复制动态关系,探讨四种情况下稳定状态的收敛性与抗扰动性。最后得出结论为不管任何状态下的复制动态关系和稳定性,政府通过调整战略和信息平台中的收益分配比重,既不影响信息主体的积极性,同时又能提高其收益,使博弈双方主体均有能力和动力推动信息转移共享,从而达到帕累托上策均衡。

In the smart city which is supported by the new generation of information technology, constructing a virtual platform of informational resource-sharing is an effective way to transfer and share the information. So this paper analyzes information forms as a factor of production in the age of agriculture, industry, information and wisdom and the necessity of the virtutal platform on information transfer. Under the bounded rationality of information transfer＆#39;s body , this thesis brings the evolutionary game theory into the information transfer process to construct a payoff matrix. Then it discusses the replicator dynamics equation and steady point＆#39;s realistic interpretation between the resource subject and government. Afterwards , the article expresses the government and the information resources subject＆#39;s dynamic replication relationship in the process of shift of sharing and the change of motivated behavior＆#39;s proportion by using the dynamic replication phase diagram, and then discusses steady state＆#39;s convergence and anti disturbance performance under the four types. Finally this thesis comes to a conclusion that no matter the dynamic replication＆#39;s relationship and the stability is in what kind of state, government not only can not affect information agent＆#39;s enthusiasm, but also increase revenue to make both parties have the ability and power to promote information＆#39;s transfer and sharing and reach the Pareto dominated equilibrium by adjusting strategies and the proportion of income distribution of information platform.