摘要
以2006-2011年沪深A股上市公司并购事件为样本,实证考察地方政府干预背景下剩余资源与企业并购之间的关系发现,不论是地方国有企业还是民营企业,剩余资源都是其发动并购的前提条件。与地方国有企业不同,民营企业在并购前贮存更多的剩余资源,更多的依靠自身的并购能力完成交易。对于地方国有企业而言,政府干预则部分替代了剩余资源的作用,显著降低了其与并购之间的相关性。
Taking the mergers & acquisitions of A_share listed companies in Shanghai and Shen-zhen Stock Exchange for years 2006-2011 as an example ,this article makes an empirical survey on the relationship between slack resources and enterprise mergers & acquisitions under the back-ground of government intervention .From the survey we discover that the slack resources are the preconditions of mergers & acquisitions for both local SOEs and private enterprises .Compared with the SOEs ,the private enterprises store more slack resources before making mergers& acqui-sitions and rely more on their own mergers & acquisitions ability to complete the deal .But for the local SOEs ,the government intervention partly replaces slack resources ’ function and decreases remarkably the correlations between slack resources and mergers & acquisitions .
出处
《北京交通大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2014年第2期42-48,共7页
Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
政府干预
剩余资源
企业并购
财务剩余
所有权性质
government intervention
slack resources
mergers &amp
acquisitions
financial slack
ownership property