行动的理由

Reasons for Action

行动者做他所做的理由是什么?自戴维森以来流行的看法是,行动的理由是欲念和信念。近来兴起的一种针锋相对的观点是,行动的理由是事实。但两种观点都有难以克服的困难。心理主义的困难是难以保证行动的世界相关性,事实主义的困难是难以解释坏情形中行动者的行动。造成两种观点陷入困难和对立的根源是威廉斯—丹西原则。这个原则默认行动的理由在好坏两种情形中是一样的。但这个原则并未得到很好的论证。假如我们去掉这个原则,我们就得到了关于行动理由的析取论。析取论兼具心理主义和事实主义的优点,又不会招致其他问题,是个合意的行动理论。

What is an agent＇s reason for doing what he did？ Since Davidson, the answer is that a reason for action is a pair of desire and belief. Nevertheless, there has been a growing trend to recognize that a reason for action is fact that favors or makes valuable an action of the relevant kind. Both these two ideas have insurmountable difficulties. The main difficulty for psychologism is that it cannot ensure the relation between action and the world. The main difficulty for factualism is that it cannot adequately explain actions agents did in bad case. As I will show, the mentioned difficulties and opposition result from the so-called Williams-Dancy Principle. This principle takes it for granted that the reason for action both in good and bad case is the same. But the presupposition is not well argued and thus is dubious. If we reject it, then we get disjunctivism of reasons for actions. Disjunctivism enjoys advantages both psychologism and factualism have. What is more, disjunctivism does not incur bad consequences. So it is a desirable theory.