基于委托代理理论的房地产劳务分包激励机制设计

Incentive mechanism design of real estate labor subcontracting based on the principal-agent theory

近些年来"招工难、用工荒"导致房地产项目施工人员流动性大、人员工作能力参差不齐,房产项目管理中因信息不对称引发道德风险问题层出不穷。本文通过分析房地产劳务分包商和施工人员之间的委托代理关系,针对房地产项目施工人员在施工过程中的道德风险问题设计了包含监督方的激励合同。并提出对劳务分包人员的激励调节机制,最后给施工人力资源管理提出相应建议。

In recent years, ＂hire difficult, labor shortage＂ makes big personnel fluidity, uneven work ability and personnel demand changed a lot in real estate project construction. The moral hazard problems emerge in endlessly in real estate project management caused by information asymmetry. This article analyzed the principal-agent rela- tionship between the construction personnel and real estate services contractors, and then designed the incentive contract including supervision in view of the personnel moral hazard problems of the process of construction in the real estate project construction. Regulation mechanism was proposed for the finally the corresponding suggestions on the construction of human resource subcontractor personnel incentive, and management were put forward.