小额贷款保证保险在缓解小微企业融资难中的作用——基于银、企、保三方的博弈分析

The Role of Microfinance Guarantee Insurance for Alleviating the Financing Difficulty of Micro-to-Small Enterprises——An Analysis Based on the Game among the Bank,Enterprise,and Insurer

当前,我国小微企业融资难问题非常突出,政府相关部门多次倡导利用小额贷款保证保险来缓解小微企业融资难。从保证保险的发展历史和我国实际来看,在我国贷款保证保险和保证担保并不完全相同。基于博弈分析可知,通过改进外部条件和进行机制设计能够有效地治理小额贷款保证保险面临的逆向选择和道德风险,使小额贷款保证保险在缓解小微企业贷款难问题上能够比保证担保更好地发挥作用,并且特别需要政府的政策扶持。

At present, Micro-to-Small Enterprises （SMEs） in China are facing with a grave problem of financing difficulty. Government departments have advocated repeatedly that Microfinance Guarantee Insurance （MGI）should be developed to help solve this problem. According to the history and reality of guarantee insurance, the loan guaran- tee insurance and guarantee are not exactly the same. Based on the game theory ,the adverse selection and moral risk of banks and SMEs on MGI can be alleviated by optimizing the external conditions and mechanism design. Moreover, MGI can better play the role in relieving the financing difficulty of SMEs than guarantee. Among these measures ,government＇s policy supports are especially important.