高管激励、非效率投资与公司业绩

Executive Incentive,Inefficient Investment and Company Performance

从代理理论出发,以2001—2010年A股上市公司的数据为研究样本检验高管激励方式、非效率投资与公司业绩之间关系,研究结果表明:显性激励和隐性激励对于投资效率和公司业绩的影响是不同的,显性激励能够通过提升投资效率来改善公司业绩,而隐性激励则没有这样的作用;在不同所有制样本中,隐性激励对国有企业影响更大,而显性激励对非国有企业影响更大。

Based on the agent theory, the paper studies the relationships among the executive incentive, inefficient investment and the performance of the company by using the data from 2001 to 2010. The study indicates that explicit and implicit incen- tives have different effects on investment efficiency and company performance. The explicit incentive can improve the company performance through the impact on investment efficiency, but implicit incentive has no such kind of function. In addition, due to the enterprises of different ownership, we also found that implicit incentive has greater impact on the state-owned enterprises while the explicit incentive has greater impact on non-state-owned enterprises.