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保险市场顺向选择:对逆向选择问题的深入探讨

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摘要 由于信息不对称,理论上保险市场中应该存在严重的逆向选择问题,但是实证结果却不尽如此。本文试图从逆向选择理论的理性人假设出发,提出顺向选择理论,并逐步引入风险偏好、风险水平和财富水平等影响因素,建立从一维到二维、三维的分析框架,研究顺向选择的产生过程。最后探讨其作用原理,即保险市场上顺向选择和逆向选择的对冲作用。 Owing to informational asymmetry, there ought to be serious adverse selection in the insurance market in theory. The empirical results, however, are sometimes opposite. Based on the hypothesis of rational man in the theory of adverse selection, this paper attempts to put forward the theory of propitious selection and study its production by leading the factors such as risk preference, risk level and weahh, etc. one by one to construct an analysis framework of one to three dimensions. At last, the process how propitious selection hedges a- gainst adverse selection in the market will be explored.
作者 李珮
出处 《保险职业学院学报》 2014年第1期25-30,共6页 Journal of Insurance Professional College
关键词 逆向选择 顺向选择 风险偏好 风险水平 财富水平 Adverse selection Propitious selection Risk preference Risk level: Wealth
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参考文献16

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