基于RPM的供应链合作促销的协调问题

Coordination of supply chain collaborative promotion based on RPM

在双边道德风险下,研究了商品需求受市场价格和促销努力共同影响下,基于RPM的供应链合作促销的协调问题,指出不存在线性分享合约能够完美协调供应链,但通过RPM和线性分享合约的组合能够实现次优的结果.分析了生产成本、价格弹性和促销弹性系数等外生变量对渠道收益和最优合约参数的影响.研究表明:市场价格或(和)批发价格的扭曲是渠道协调失败的根源.最后,用数值模拟方法验证了文中的主要结论.

Assuming that the demand for goods is jointly affected by commodity prices and promotional efforts, this paper investigates the coordination problem of supply chain collaborative promotion with double moral hazard based on RPM. It points out that there is no such a linear contract that can completely coordinate the supply chains. However, the second optimal results can be realized by RPM and the optimal linear sharing contract. It also analyzes how exogenous variables, such as the production cost, price elasticity coefficient and promotional elasticity coefficients and so on, can affect the supply chain profit and the optimal contract parameters. It shows that distortions of the retail price or/and wholesale price can lead to the failure of the supply chain coordination. The main conclusions are verified by numerical simulations.