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应用于林地林木流转的拍卖计量方法述评 被引量:2

A Survey of Auction Econometrics Method Applying for the Circulation of Forest Tenure
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摘要 为使林地和林木的流转公开化、市场化,使其所有者获得尽可能大的利润空间,目前林地、林木的流转在世界各地更多采用公开拍卖的方式进行,相应地关于林地、林木流转拍卖数据的资源储备也非常完备。在我国自新一轮林权制度改革以来,很多地区要求森林资源的转让要依法采用拍卖、招标方式进行,而应用于林地、林木流转的拍卖计量方法研究却远远滞后。为此,文章以目前主流的三种结构计量方法为中心展开分析,对独立私人价值模型下拍卖计量方法的相关文献进行了梳理和总结,并提出未来研究需要关注的方向,以期为我国集体林权改革中林地林木流转问题的深入研究提供借鉴。 Now the circulation of forest tenure tends to marketization, the owner of forest tenure is to chase more profit, more and more public auctions are adopted in the world. At the same time, the related data resource is be- coming very rich. In our country, many regions require that the forest resource is transferred must through bidding or auction in the new reform of collective forest rights. But the auction econometrics methods applying to the cir- culation of forest tenure have long been overdue. Therefore, three current main structural estimation approaches are taken as center. This paper analyzes and summarizes related literatures about structural econometric methods in independent private value auction model, and proposes the future research directions. The purpose is to provide ref- erences for the study on the circulation of forest tenure in the reform ofcoUective forest rights.
出处 《林业经济》 北大核心 2014年第4期43-52,共10页 Forestry Economics
基金 北京林业大学青年科技启动基金"拍卖计量方法研究及其在集体林权流转中的应用"(编号:BLX2011028) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金"集体林区林权流转机制研究"(编号:JGTD2014-04)
关键词 林地林木流转 拍卖计量方法 伪最大似然估计 模拟非线性最小二乘估计 非参数估计 the circulation of forest tenure auction econometrics method Maximum Likelihood Estimation Sim-ulated Non-linear Least Squares Estimation Nonparametric Estimation
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