农村非正规金融的私人治理:一个理论模型

Rural informal finance of private governance: a theoretical model

与具有官方背景的农村正规金融机构相比,中国农村非正规金融之所以具有较高的制度效率,关键在于其独特的私人治理机制,这有效地解决了金融市场中的逆向选择问题与道德风险问题。从制度经济学的视角对农村非正规金融的私人治理机理进行理论剖析有助于揭开农村非正规金融的生存逻辑之谜。研究发现,信息传递与村庄信任机制、动态及关联博弈过程、灵活担保方式、强道德约束等因素为农村非正规金融的有效运作提供了稳定的制度构件,但外部经济条件的转变会对农村非正规金融治理机制带来不利冲击。

Compared with the official background of rural formal financial institutions, China＇s system of rural informal finance is with high efficiency. The key lies in its unique private governance mechanism, which can effectively solve the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets. From the perspective of institutional economics, the private governance mechanism of rural informal finance theory analyzing helps uncover the mysteries of the survival logic of rural informal finance. The study finds that information transfer and village trust mechanism, dynamic and associated game process, flexible way of guarantee and strong moral constraint factors provide the effective operation of the rural informal finance with stable institution components. But the transition of the impact on rural informal financial governance mechanism. external economic conditions will bring adverse