期刊文献+

“资本束”下的公司治理:基于交易费用的分析框架

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摘要 文章以交易费用理论为研究框架,以凸显企业人力资源的价值。研究发现:通过物力资本所有者和人力资源所有者重复剩余分享博弈,每一次博弈均衡都将使人力资源所有者在既定条件下分享公司剩余的状态得到改善。然而,于企业物力资本所有者而言,这也将产生更大的企业交易费用,而且人力资本专有性越大,其产生的交易费用也越大。
作者 黄蘋
出处 《统计与决策》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第22期57-60,共4页 Statistics & Decision
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71102178)
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参考文献10

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