基于套期保值的双寡头零售商供应链均衡策略分析

EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY ANALYSIS IN A SUPPLY CHAIN WITH DUOPOLY RETAILERS UNDER HEDGING

考虑一个供应商和两个零售商构成的供应链,零售商在面对市场需求风险时决策是否采用套期保值来规避风险.文章分别分析了Cournot和Bertrand两种博弈情景.研究表明:两种博弈存在相同的纳什均衡,两个零售商都会采取套期保值策略.在Cournot博弈下,零售商通过套期保值能够为供应商带来更多的利润;而在Bertrand博弈下,零售商选择套期保值却会降低供应商的利润.相比Cournot博弈,供应商在Bertrand博弈下获利更高.

In this paper,we study a supply chain which consists with a supplier and two retailers.The retailers decide whether to adopt the hedging strategy to avoid risk when they face the market demand uncertainty.This problem is investigated under both Cournot and Bertrand games,respectively.The study shows that two games have the same Nash equilibrium and that both retailers finally adopt the hedging strategy.Under Cournot game scheme,the retailers can bring more profits for supplier by hedging strategy,while the result is the opposite under Bertrand game scheme.Compared with Cournot game scheme,the supplier obtains more profit under Bertrand game scheme.