摘要
建立一个存在盈余管理下的经理股权激励缔约的博弈模型。模型的结果表明:股权激励的动机包括效率动机和治理动机,资本市场的低效率会降低企业实施股权激励的治理动机;股权激励的水平是股权激励契约中的关键要素,它不但决定了缔约双方所能获得的"帕累托改善",还会影响缔约后经理盈余管理的程度。
A game model of CEO equity incentive contract is developed in the presence of earnings management. The model shows that the motivation of equity incentive includes pursuing Pareto Efficiency and improving corporate governance. But lower efficiency of the capital market would lead weaker motiva- tion for companies implementing equity incentive. The level of equity incentive is the key element in the equity incentive contract. It not only determines the Pareto Improvement each player can share, but also affects the degree of earnings management after contracting.
出处
《黑龙江大学自然科学学报》
CAS
北大核心
2014年第2期171-175,共5页
Journal of Natural Science of Heilongjiang University
基金
上海市自然科学基金资助项目(13ZR1401400)
关键词
经理股权激励
动机
激励水平
盈余管理
CEO equity incentive
motivation
incentive level
earnings management