我国上市公司CEO薪酬存在“幸运支付”吗——“揩油论”抑或“契约论”

Does CEO Compensation Exist Luck Pay in Chinese Listed Companies:Skimming View or Contracting View?

传统的“契约论”无法有效揭示高管薪酬“幸运支付”现象背后的原因，最新研究从高管权力理论的视角用“揩油论”对这一现象进行解释。本文基于“幸运支付”假说，采用两阶段最小二乘法（2SLS）剥离CEO“幸运薪酬”，对2005～2011年我国上市公司面板数据进行分析，发现CEO薪酬存在显著的“幸运支付”现象，支持“揩油论”：（1）CEO利用内部信息“揩油”，当使用市场业绩指标时，CEO薪酬对“幸运业绩”的敏感性与其对公司总业绩的敏感性相同，当使用会计业绩指标时，“幸运业绩”的敏感度超过后者；（2）从实际控制人出发，发现相对非国有企业而言，国有企业CEO薪酬存在更为严重的“幸运支付”现象；（3）采用消费价格指数衡量宏观经济的“幸运因子”时，发现排除市场力量因素后，上述结论仍然成立。这为我国上市公司尤其是国有企业CEO薪酬激励机制改革提供了依据。

It is very difficult to explain why CEOs gain ＂Luck Pay＂ in terms of the traditional Optimal Contracting View, Skimming View based on Managerial Power Theory is used to explore it recently. The paper finds CEO Compensation exists luck pay by surveying Chinese listed companies of 2005 - 2011 and analyzing them through separating luck pay by using two stage least squares （2SLS）, finally it supports Skimming View：（ 1 ） CEOs skim by using insider information on firm performance. The sensitive of CEO compensation to luck pay is nearly the same as it to general pay if using firm market performance, and it will be much higher if using accounting performance;（2） CEO compensation exists more serious luck pay in state- owned enterprises than those non state - owned enterprises in terms of firm characteristics; （ 3 ） Luck pay still exists in Chinese state - owned enterprises even if we take away macroeconomics factor such as Consumer Price Index and so on. As a result, it guides the listed companies, especially, state -owned enterprises, to design their CEO compensation packages in practice.