审计师行业专长、经济依赖性与审计质量——基于审计任期的视角

Auditor Industry Specialization,Economic Dependence and Audit Quality——A Perspective of Auditing Tenure

本文以2006～2011年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本，检验在不同的审计任期下，审计师行业专长和经济依赖性对审计质量的影响。实证研究发现，在短期内，具有行业专长的审计师能够有效地提高审计质量；在长期中，当具有行业专长的审计师对行业内客户的经济依赖性增大时，审计质量将会降低。本文的研究结论有助于我们更好的理解中国审计师行业专门化战略与审计师强制轮换制度。

Based on samples of Chinese listed companies from 2006 to 2011, this paper examines how auditor specialization and auditors＇ economic dependence affect auditing quality given different auditor tenures. The empirical results show that firms audited by industry specialists have relatively higher audit quality in short tenure, but audit quality will be weakened with the extension of tenure because extended auditor tenure may create negative economic incentives for industry specialists. These findings provide further un- derstanding on the effect of auditor industry specialization strategy and mandatory rotation.