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悲观归纳、新归纳和未被设想的替代者问题 被引量：2

Pessimistic Induction, New Induction and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives
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摘要 科学实在论与反实在论之争是科学哲学研究的热点。斯马特、普特南等人提出奇迹论证为科学理论成功与真理的关系辩护,劳丹等人基于科学史案例提出悲观归纳论证加以反驳。围绕科学理论所设定的实体以及理论是否趋真等问题两个阵营争论不断,美国学者P.凯尔·斯坦福在悲观归纳论证基础上,提出科学史的新归纳以及未被设想的替代者问题等新的论证,质疑科学实在论。悲观归纳和新归纳虽同为归纳,但侧重点不同。斯坦福的未被设想的替代者问题颇具深意。 Scientific realists put forward the no miracle argument to defend the relationship between success of scientific theories and truth. L. Laudan and other authors confute realism by pessimistic induction based on the history of science. Kyle Stanford makes an argument, the new induction over the history of science, and the conception of uneonceived alternatives, to question the scientific realism .The new induction is different from pes- simistic induction, and the problem of unconceived alternatives deserves careful pondering.
作者 宋志润
机构地区 华南师范大学公共管理学院
出处 《自然辩证法研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第5期3-8,共6页 Studies in Dialectics of Nature
关键词 凯尔·斯坦福 新归纳 未被设想的替代者 悲观归纳 反实在论 Kyle Stanford New induction Unconceived alternatives Pessimistic induction Antirealism
分类号 N031 [自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]
  • 相关文献

参考文献18

  • 1P. Kyle Stanford. Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconeeived Ahematives [M]. New York: Ox-ford University Press, 2006.
  • 2J. J. C. Smart. Philosophy and Scientific Realism[M]. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1963.
  • 3Hilary Putnam. Mathematics, Matter and Method (Philosophical Papers, vol. I) [M]. London: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
  • 4Richard N. Boyd.On the current status of the issue of scientific realism[J]. Erkenntnis, 1983, 19, ( 1-3): 45-90.
  • 5Stathis Psillos. Philosophy of Science A-Z[M].Edinburgh: Ed- inburgh University Press Lt, 2007.
  • 6Stathis Psillos. Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth [M]. London: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.
  • 7巴斯·范·弗拉森.科学的形象[M].郑祥福译.上海:上海译文出版社,2002.
  • 8Henri Poincare. Science and Hypothesis [M]. London: the Walter Scott Publishing Co Ltd, 1905.
  • 9Hilary Putnam. Meaning and the moral sciences [M]. London, Henley, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1978.
  • 10Larry Laudan. A Confutation of Convergent Realism [J]. Phi- losophy of Science, 1981,48( 1): 19-49.

二级参考文献35

  • 1成素梅,郭贵春.语境论的真理观[J].哲学研究,2007(5):73-78. 被引量：17
  • 2Andre Kukla, "Antirealist Explanations of the Success of Science" ,philosohpy ofscience,1996,p. 298 ;p. 298.
  • 3Stathis Psillos, "Scientific Realism and the Pessimistic Induction", Philosophy of Science, 1996, p. 306 ; p. 307 ;p. 307 ;p. 310.
  • 4H. Putnam, Mathematics, Matter and Method, Cambridge University Press, 1975 ,p. 73.
  • 5Larry Laudan," A Confutation of Convergent Realism", Philosophy of Science, 1981, p. 71 ; p. 47.
  • 6James R Brown, "The Miracle of Science" ,The Philosophical Quarterly, 1982 ,pp. 232 -233 ;p. 233.
  • 7T. Juha Saatsi," On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies" ,Philosophy of Science, 2006, p. 1088.
  • 8Larry Laudan," Realism without the Real", Philosophy of Science, 1984, Vol. 1, p. 156.
  • 9S. Psillos ,Scientific Realism :How Science Tracks Truth, 1999, p. 101.
  • 10Kitcher," The Advancement of Science", Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 149.

共引文献439

同被引文献16

  • 1胡志强.关于不完全确定论题[J].哲学研究,2005(4):87-91. 被引量：1
  • 2托马斯·库恩 金吾伦 胡新和译.《科学革命的结构》[M].北京大学出版社,2003年版.第100页.
  • 3迪昂.《物理理论的目的和结构》,孙小礼等译,商务印书馆.2005年版,第89页.
  • 4Kyle Stanford, " Underdetermination of Scientific Theory", Edward N. Zalta, ed. Philosophy, 2013, http: //plato. stanford, edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/.
  • 5A. Kukla, "Does Every Theory Have Empirically Equivalent Rivals?", Erkenntnis, 44, , The Stanford Encyclopedia of 1996, p. 137.
  • 6范‘弗拉森:《科学的形象》,郑祥福译,上海译文出版社,2005,第59页.
  • 7Laudan, Leplin, "Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination", The Journal of Philosophy, 9, 1991, p. 475.
  • 8Kyle Stanford, "Refusing the Devil's Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously.'?", Philosophy of Science, 9, 2001, p. 5.
  • 9Kyle Stanford, Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 14.
  • 10Chakravartty, "What You Don't Know Can't Hurt You : Realism and the Unconceived", Philosophical Studies, 137, 2008, p. 149.

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自然辩证法研究
2014年 第5期

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