感觉印象自身能否作为我们辩护信念的理由?

Can perceptions themselves be a reason to justify our beliefs?

"直接实在论"是一种由美国著名哲学家约翰·波洛克对辩护进行了自然主义的解释之后提出的辩护理论。按照这种理论,知觉印象本身直接就可以作为我们的信念的理由,为我们的信念提供辩护,无需先将知觉印象变成知觉信念,然后才能为我们的其他信念提供辩护。然而,"辩护"这个概念在知识论中有两种不同的含义:一、作为知识的一个必要条件,它是使真信念成为知识的东西;二、作为一种"程序辩护",它是决定着我们是否应当持有一个信念的东西。而感觉印象能否成为我们辩护信念的理由,完全取决于在何种意义上理解"辩护"这个概念。

＂Direct realism＂ is one theory of justification which is propounded by Pollock, basing on his naturalistic explanation of justification. Ac- cording to this theory, perceptions themselves can directly be a reason for our beliefs and provide justification for our beliefs. But there are two types of ＂justification＂. Firstly, as a necessary condition for knowledge, it is what makes true belief become knowledge. Secondly, as a kind of ＂procedural justification＂, it is what decides whether we should hold a belief. Whether perceptions themselves can directly be a reason for our beliefs and provide justification for our beliefs depends on how we understand the notion of justification.