摘要
保险公司的逐利性与政策性农业保险的非赢利性存在矛盾,并且政府与保险公司在政策性农业保险中形成委托代理关系。为了使保险公司参与政策性农业保险的经营管理,控制保险公司道德风险,提高农业保险的运作效率,应根据政府与保险公司的风险偏好,构建由低风险报酬和高风险报酬共同组成的激励机制。
The insurance company's profit-driven and policy-oriented agricultural insurance nonprofit contradictions, and the formation of the govemment and insurance companies the agency relationship in policy agricultural insurance. To make the insurance companies involved in policy-oriented agricultural insurance management, insurance companies control moral hazard, improve operational efficiency of agricultural insurance, government and insurance companies should be based on risk appetite, to build incentives reward low risk and high risk reward composed of.
出处
《科技与创新》
2014年第5期114-115,共2页
Science and Technology & Innovation
关键词
农业保险
保险公司
激励机制
风险
agricultural insurance
insurance companies
incentives
risk