应诉或和解——成本收益视角下知识产权诉讼策略博弈分析

Respond or Settlements ——Game Analysis on Intellectual Property Right Litigation Strategies Based on Cost-profit

知识产权诉讼已成为许多跨国公司获得相对竞争优势的一种企业战略。从成本收益角度构建知识产权企业与潜在侵权企业之间两阶段且不完全信息的动态博弈模型,利用逆向归纳法求解推导出博弈均衡解,结果表明:企业自主研发收益与成本、剽窃收益与成本决定着知识产权企业保护知识产权的积极性和潜在侵权人剽窃的可能性;和解赔偿金越大,知识产权企业坚持起诉与潜在侵权企业选择应诉的可能性越大;律师费用越高,知识产权企业选择撤诉与潜在侵权企业选择和解的可能性越大;知识产权企业胜诉的期望收益越大,知识产权企业坚持起诉与潜在侵权企业选择和解的可能性越大。其次,选择三星公司与苹果公司之间知识产权诉讼博弈案例,通过相关数据计算得出这两家公司之间应诉或和解的诉讼策略,验证了模型的有效性。最后,得出我国政府与企业应对知识产权诉讼的几点启示。

In this fiercely competitive market, more and more enterprises begin to use intellectual property right （IPR） litigation strategy to gain more competitive advantages. The patentee enterprises decide whether to suit or not, and the in- fringer decides to respond or ask for settlement. Firstly, on the basis of cost - profit, the paper examines enterprises＇ in- tellectual right litigation strategy by building two - period and imperfect - information game model, and then draws out the equilibrium （the suiting strategies of patentee and infringer enterprises） by backward induction. Results are as follows： （ 1 ） The profit and cost of independent R＆D and plagiarism decide the possibility of patentee＇ s enthusiasm to protect its intellectual right, as well as the possibility of the potential infringer＇ s plagiarism; （2） The larger the reconciliation of compensation, the more likely the patentee will suit and potential infringer will respond ; （ 3 ） The larger the attorney fee, the more likely the patentee will withdraw the suit and potential infringer will choose settlement; （4） The larger the expec- ted revenue for winning party, the greater probability of suiting from the patentee and choosing settlement by potential in- fringer; Secondly, the paper tests the validity of the model by taking Apple - Samsung patent game as a case. Finally, several enlightenments are given for both the government and the enterprises.