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制度创新:维护政治安全的根本路径 被引量:4

Institutional Innovation: Fundamental Path for Maintaining Political Security
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摘要 中共十八届三中全会提出全面深化改革总目标时,强调到2020年要形成系统完备、科学规范、运行有效的制度体系。制度对政治安全起着核心保障作用,而制度僵化则是政治安全的致命威胁。一旦出现制度僵化的现象,制度不仅不会成为政治安全的有力保障,反而会成为政治安全的阻碍。因此,在全面深化改革时期,欲求维护政治安全就需要通过深化体制改革,克服制度僵化现象,不断推进制度创新。制度创新是制度生命力之所在,也是保持制度活力的源泉,更是维护政治安全的根本路径。 The 3rd Plenary of the 18th CPC Central Committee sets out the overall objective for comprehensively deep- ening reform, which emphasizes that by 2020, the institutional system shall be in place with complete configuration, scien- tific and standardized structure, and effective operation. Institutional system plays a core role in maintaining po|itieal secur- ity, while institutional rigidity is a fatal threat to political security. Once the rigidity is in existence, institutional system will not be a strong safeguard for political security, and will become an obstacle for political security. Therefore, when compre- hensively deepening reform, the maintaining of political security should be done with deepened institutional reform to over- come rigidity in system and to constantly promote institutional innovation. Institutional innovation is the vitality of the sys- tem, the source of life-force of the system, and the fundamental path for maintaining political security.
作者 虞崇胜 张星
出处 《江苏行政学院学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第3期87-92,共6页 The Journal of Jiangsu Administration Institute
基金 国家社会科学基金重点项目"中国特色社会主义政治发展道路的理论 路径和机制研究"(12AZZ001)的阶段性成果
关键词 政治安全 制度创新 制度僵化 全面深化改革 : political security system innovation rigidity in system comprehensively deepening reform
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