高管官员背景与国有企业过度投资:“自由现金流量假说”抑或“政府干预假说”?

Top-managers' Official Background and Over-investments of SOEs:FCF Hypothesis or Government Intervention Hypothesis?

以具有官员背景的国有上市公司为分析样本,本文实证检验了"自由现金流量假说"与"政府干预假说"。结果显示,过度投资与自由现金流量显著正相关,符合"自由现金流量假说"。此外,相对于地方国有企业,自由现金流量对中央企业的过度投资影响较大。本研究的意义在于为理解和治理国有企业的过度投资问题提供理论支持。

Choosing SOEs which have official background as research sample , FCF hypothesis and gov-ernment intervention hypothesis are both tested .Results show that over -investments of SOEs are posi-tively correlated with FCF and FCF hypothesis ,which conforms to FCF hypothesis .Results also show that FCF effects central enterprises more than local SOEs .This paper may provide theory support for realiza-tion and resolution of SOEs ’ over-investments.