摘要
Kernel hooks are very important control data in OS kernel.Once these data are compromised by attackers,they can change the control flow of OS kernel’s execution.Previous solutions suffer from limitations in that:1)some methods require modifying the source code of OS kernel and kernel modules,which is less practical for wide deployment;2)other methods cannot well protect the kernel hooks and function return addresses inside kernel modules whose memory locations cannot be predetermined.To address these problems,we propose OPKH,an on-the-fly hook protection system based on the virtualization technology.Compared with previous solutions,OPKH offers the protected OS a fully transparent environment and an easy deployment.In general,the working procedure of OPKH can be divided into two steps.First,we utilise the memory virtualization for offline profiling so that the dynamic hooks can be identified.Second,we exploit the online patching technique to instrument the hooks for run-time protection.The experiments show that our system can protect the dynamic hooks effectively with minimal performance overhead.
Kernel hooks are very important con- trol data in OS kernel. Once these data are com- promised by attackers, they can change the control flow of OS kemel＇s execution. Previ- ous solutions suffer from limitations in that： 1） some methods require modifying the source code of OS kernel and kernel modules, which is less practical for wide deployment; 2） other methods cannot well protect the kernel hooks and function return addresses inside kernel mo- dules whose memory locations cannot be pre- determined. To address these problems, we propose OPKH, an on-the-fly hook protection system based on the virtualization technology. Compared with previous solutions, OPKH off- ers the protected OS a fully transparent envi- ronment and an easy deployment. In general, the working procedure of OPKH can be di- vided into two steps. First, we utilise the me- mory virtualization for offiine profiling so that the dynamic hooks can be identified. Second, we exploit the online patching technique to in- strument the hooks for run-time protection. The experiments show that our system can pro- tect the dynamic hooks effectively with mini- mal performance overhead.
基金
supported in part by the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China(863 Program)under Grant No.2009AA01Z433
the Project of National Ministry under Grant No.A21201-10006
the Open Foundation of State Key Laboratory of Information Security(Institute of Information Engineering,Chinese Academy of Sciences)under Grant No.2013-4-1
