管理者研发支出资本化选择与盈余管理动机研究

Research on Capitalized Selection of R&D Expenditures and Management Motivation of Earnings on Part of Managers

我国于2006年颁布的《会计准则》允许研发支出有条件资本化后,管理者是否会出于自身的目的在研发支出资本化选择过程中进行盈余管理迅速成为争议的焦点。文章采用实证研究方法,研究了管理者研发支出资本化选择与盈余管理动机之间的关系。实证结果表明:上市公司的研发投入强度越大,管理者对研发支出资本化的倾向越大;研发支出资本化过程中,管理者出于债务契约动机会进行盈余管理,但出于报酬契约动机和政治成本动机进行盈余管理未获得支持。

Since R＆D expenditures have been capitalized conditionally according to The Accounting Standards prom- ulgated in 2006 in China, whether the managers do earnings management for their own on purpose during the choice of R＆D expenditures capitalization becomes the focus of discussing rapidly. This paper adopts empirical research method in researc- hing the relationship between managers＇ choices of R＆D expenditures capitalization and earnings management motivation. The results show that the more intensity in R＆D investment in listed corporation, the greater the managers＇intension of R＆D expenditure capitalization. In the process of R＆D expenditure capitalization, managers will carry on the earnings manage- ment out of their motivation of debt contract, while the motivation of compensation contract and political cost in earnings management is not supported.