银保合作机制研究——基于一个博弈模型的分析

Research on the Bancassurance Based on Repeated Game Theory

近年来随着我国金融改革的逐步深化,银保合作作为一种金融创新模式进一步推动了我国银行和保险业的发展。为此运用博弈理论对我国银保长期合作问题进行研究,分别从单次博弈和重复博弈两种情况对银保合作中的制约因素进行分析,得出银行在长期合作中的激励和惩罚措施可以有效地约束保险公司的机会主义行为,并给出相应的对策,为银保合作的长期发展提供理论参考。

In recent years, with the gradual deepening of China＇s financial reform, Bancassurance as a model to further promote financial innovation of China＇s banking and insurance. Using Game theory to study the long-term cooperation of Baneassurance. To research the constraints of Bancassurance from single game and repeated game. Results in long-term cooperation in banking incentives and punitive measures can effectively constrain the opportunistic behavior of insurance companies, and to proposed the corresponding countermeasures for the long-term development as a theoretical reference.