有限融资的供应链金融系统协调策略

Optimal Coordination Strategies for Supply Chain Financing with Loan Limit

本文在需求不确定环境下,设计了一个由资金约束零售商、制造商和商业银行组成的供应链金融系统,研究了基于有限融资的供应链金融系统最优决策及协调策略。考虑零售商的资金约束程度、信用额度和破产概率,分析了制造商为主方、商业银行为次主方及零售商为从方的Stackelberg主从策略,分别求解了零售商的最优订货决策、银行的最优融资额度及制造商的最优批发价格,并探讨了在有限融资条件下批发价格契约实现供应链金融有效协调的条件。最后通过数值算例分析了零售商不同资金约束程度对供应链金融系统最优策略的影响,并验证了理论分析的结果。结论表明,基于有限融资的批发价格契约能够增加供应链金融系统各参与主体的预期收益,并通过有效协调提高供应链系统的渠道效率。

While the integration of material and information flows within the supply chain has been discussed and tested in practice, the flow of financial resources is increasingly taking centre stage of attention. Providing fi- nance to trade along the supply chain has recently become a fundamental business of some banks, providing real val- ue to many companies. Supply chain financing is the response to an emerging need for banks to play a more active role in the activities of suppliers and buyers. While most papers only consider the separate operational decisions for capital-constrained supply chain, we try to study the multi-level Stackelberg games among the traditional partners and the commercial bank in a SCF setting. In our work we pay more attention to the whole SCF system composed of the financially constrained retailer, the commercial bank and the manufacturer. Our work fits in the broad area of in- terfaces of operational and financial decisions, which has recently received substantial interest. In particular, we fo- cused on how the credit lines and initial capitals interact with ordering and pricing decisions. The research in supply chain financing field refers to multi-disciplines, such as financial engineering, corporate finance, logistics and supply chain management and operation management, and so on. Our paper extends the existing literature of game-theoretic models in supply chain management by explicitly in- corporating capital constraints into the field of supply chain contract coordination problems. In this paper,we mainly focus on three issues. First, we design a SCF system composed of a financially constrained retailer, a manufacturer and a commercial bank as the ＂capital supplier＂. The retailer faces a situation equivalent to the classical newsven- dor, but he is capital-constrained in the procurement process. In order to improve the supply chain efficiency he chooses to finance from the commercial bank. In this system framework we formulate the inter-functional and inter- organizational activities as multi-level Stackelberg games in which the manufacturer acts as the leader and the as bank the sub-leader, in which all participants have a decision object of profit maximizing. We characterize the equi- librium solution for each partner and present comparative statics both analytically and numerically. Second, from the lender＇s point of view,we consider the finite financing scheme,i, e. ,the borrower（retailer） cannot borrow up to cov- er all his capital constraint. Moreover, considering the retailer＇s capital-constraint degree, credit line and bankruptcy risk, we analyze the optimal loan limit of the commercial bank, the optimal order of the retailer and the optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer respectively. Third, in order to investigate the interactions between the opera- tional and financial decisions, we analyze the coordination condition of wholesale price contract in the SCF sys- tem. We conduct numerical examples to analyze the impact of retailer＇s capital constraint on optimal strategies for supply chain finance system which validate our theoretical analysis. Through our analyses, we establish the major results that in the capital-constrained supply chain there exist im- portant interdependencies between financial and operational decisions which cannot be decoupled. Importantly, through efficient fiuancing scheme can be an effective incentive to motivate the retailer order more. Furthermore, un- der a suitable credit line the wholesale price contract with loan scheme may c^ordinate the SCF system, which can- not be realized in the traditional supply chain. There are several contributions that arise from our analysis. The mod- eling framework we proposed can be used to design the SCF structures with other kinds of financing modes. Moreover,while our analysis is squarely focused on the multi-level Stackelberg games of decentralized SCF systems, the model also generalizes to determine the condition of contract mechanisms realizing coordination. Our re- suits may be helpful in analyzing SCF operations and contract coordination for both theoretical researchers and prac- tical practitioners, especially for the small-and-medium enterprises（SMEs）.