反运气认知的三条进路比较

Approaches from the Aspect of Excluding Epistemic Luck

通常认为,获得知识不能靠碰运气,凭借好运气获得的真信念不足以被视为知识。知识与运气是近年来认识论研究的热门话题。一般认为,一个好的知识理论应该能排除认知运气的影响。在当代认识论中,过程可靠主义、德性认识论和反运气认识论这三条主要进路都分别在一定程度上排除了认知运气,但各自都存在明显不足。由于缺乏对"运气"统一的、明晰的概念,迄今为止还没有一种认知论进路能够完全满足排除认知运气这一要求。

It is widely held that a belief, even if it is true, cannot count as knowledge if it is dependent upon luck in some significant measure. The concept of luck plays a crucial role in many epistemological discussions. This paper will offer an analysis on the problem of how three influential approaches—process reliabilism, virtue epistemology and anti-luck epistemology—exclude luck that is incompatible with knowledge possessing. Finally, it will conclude that none of these three approaches can successfully eliminate epistemic luck.