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政治关联、高管薪酬与企业未来经营绩效 被引量:248

The Political Connections, the CEO's Salary, and Firm's Future Management Performances
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摘要 本文紧密结合中国的制度背景,考察不同产权性质的企业中政治关联对高管薪酬的影响,以及这种影响对公司未来经营绩效的作用。以2001~2011年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,本文研究发现,在控制其他影响高管薪酬的经济因素和公司治理因素后,不管是在国有企业还是在非国有企业中,政治关联公司的高管都获得了显著较高的薪酬。但是,在国有企业中,由政治关联导致的高管超额薪酬与公司未来的经营绩效显著负相关;而在非国有企业中,由政治关联导致的超额薪酬则与公司未来的经营业绩显著正相关。这些结果表明,政治关联的国有企业高管获取了过度薪酬,是一种有损企业未来绩效的机会主义行为;而政治关联的非国有企业高管所获得的较高薪酬则是对其较强的寻租能力的一种补偿和激励。此外,本文进一步的检验还发现,在中央政府控制的国有企业中,以及在政府干预较强的地区,政治关联的国有企业高管的过度薪酬问题更加严重。 Combining closely China's institutional background, we have investigated the effect of the political connections on CEO's salary in the firms of the nature of different property right, and the impact of this impact on the future operation performances. Taking as a specimen non-financial A-share listed companies between 2001 and 2011, we have found that, after other economic factors that impact on CEO's salary and the factors of the corporate management are controlled, no matter in SOEs or non-SOEs, all CEOs of politically connected firms obtained significantly high salaries.However, in the state-owned, CEO's excess compensation resulted from the political connection is negatively related to company's future firm performances, however, in non-national firms, the excessive salary led by the political link is obviously and negatively related to company's future operation performances; but in non-national enterprises, the excessive salary resulted from the political link is positively related to company's future operation performances. Theseis an opportunist behavior that harms firm's future performances, and that, however, the excessive salary obtained by the CEOs of non-national firms in political links is a kind of compensation and encouragement for relatively great ability of seeking rent. Furthermore, by further tests we have also discovered that, in the national firms controlled by the centre government, and in the regions in which the government intervention is relatively stronger, more severe is the problem of the excessive salary obtained by the CEOs in the national firms with the political links.
作者 唐松 孙铮
出处 《管理世界》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第5期93-105,187-188,共13页 Journal of Management World
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:71372042 71172141和71372041)的阶段性研究成果 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(批准号:12JJD790033) 上海财经大学“211工程”四期重点学科建设项目的资助
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