摘要
Resale price maintenance(RPM) exerts both positive and negative influences on the market competition.Such duality and the consequent difficulties in presenting evidence have often become highly controversial issues in anti-monopoly law enforcement.We found that in reality,effects of jump-dealing and RPM can offset each other.This paper systematically proposed the offsetting theory of jump-dealing and RPM,and analyzed their policy implications for anti price monopoly,thus providing some simple principles and methods to the law enforcement against vertical price monopoly.This will not only reduce the possible "superfluous actions " in current law enforcement,but also help avoid compounded mistakes due to difficulties of enforcement.
Resale price maintenance （RPM） exerts both positive and negative influences on the market competition. Such duality and the consequent difficulties in presenting evidence have often become highly controversial issues in anti-monopoly law enforcement. We found that in reality, effects of jump-dealing and RPM can offset each other. This paper systematically proposed the offsetting theory of jump-dealing and RPM,, and analyzed their policy implications for anti price monopoly, thus providing some simple principles and methods to the law enforcement against vertical price monopoly. This will not only reduce the possible ＂superfluous actions＂ in current law enforcement, but also help avoid compounded mistakes due to difficulties of enforcement.
基金
phase-wise achievement of the project B-T-C Paradigm and Application of "Jump-dealing"(Project No.:71272190)funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China,headed by Professor Yu Li,vice president of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,director of Center for Economic Analysis of Law and Policy Evaluation and member of Expert Advisory Board of the State Council Anti-monopoly Commission of China
