日本证券市场监管改革的博弈分析

The Game Analysis of the Japanese Securities Market Regulation Reform

日本证券市场历经百年动荡与磨炼，其顺应市场需求的证券监管制度多次变迁保证了证券市场的健康发展。本文以日本证券市场监管体制的历史演变及监管法律制度变迁为依托，构建基于成本收益的博弈模型，对日本证券市场的改革与发展进行博弈分析。1868～1945年日本无专门证券监管阶段的“囚徒困境”，导致了同时期日本证券市场监管的低效率；而1998年后金融厅统一监管时期监管体制的全面改革及市场规则设置使证券市场运营趋向均衡状态，证券市场健康良性运转。由此，我国应选择性借鉴日本证券监管体制改革的成功经验，进行大部制改革、遵循“适合性原则”、建立多层次证券法律体系、发展混业经营并寻求市场干预和政府干预相结合的最佳点，使我国证券市场运行趋向最终接近帕累托最优状态。

Japan＇s securities market experienced a century of turmoil and honing,over which a series of chan- ges of securities regulation system in response to market demand ensured the healthy development of securities market. Relying on the historical evolution of the regulatory system of Japanese securities market and the tran- sition of regulation legal system, this paper establishes the game model based on cost - benefit and performs game analysis of reform and development of Japanese securities market. The results show that the prisoners dilemma of the phase without special securities regulation in Japan from 1868 to 1945 make Japan＇s securities market regulation inefficient. After 1998, in the period of unified regulation of FSA, comprehensive reform of regulatory system and establishment of market rules make market operation tend to be balanced. Consequently, China should selectively learn from Japan＇s advanced experience, such as carrying on super - ministry reform, following the principle of suitability, establishing multilevel securities law system, developing the mixed man- agement and seeking the best mutually integrated point of the market intervention and government intervention so as to China＇s securities market eventually approach Pareto Optimality.