投资保护主义的政治经济机理与经验分析——以OECD国家为例

An Empirical Study on the Political Economy Mechanism of Investment Protectionism with the Evidence from OECD Countries

文章运用政治经济学分析框架,对OECD国家IFDI保护水平的形成机制与影响因素进行经验研究。研究发现:OECD国家投资保护水平与其选民的经济技能、政治技能以及执政党的党派性密切相关。选民经济技能越强,对IFDI政策越宽松,投资保护水平越低;选民政治技能越强,IFDI政策越严苛,投资保护水平越高;执政党为具有左翼倾向的政党时,其对IFDI的政策倾向越宽松。同时,经济技能与政治技能相互作用也会对其IFDI政策产生影响。选民经济技能、政治技能双高时,更偏好于宽松的IFDI政策;选民经济技能低、政治技能高时,更偏好于严苛的IFDI政策。

This paper explores the formation mechanism of the OECD countries＇ protection level on IFDI and the related political, economic and institutional factors based on the framework of political economy. It finds that besides the factors under the framework of traditional theory of trade and investment, the IFDI protection level of the OECD countries is also determined by the economic and political skill of the voter and the partisanship of the ruling party. The stronger the economic skill of the voter is, the looser the IFDI policy and the lower the investment protection level will be; the stronger the political skill of the voter is, the stricter the IFDI policy and the higher the investment protection level will be; when the ruling party has the left orientation, it prefers to loosen the IFDI policy. In addition, the interaction between the economic and political skills also has an impact on the making of the IFDI policy. The higher the economic and political skills of the voter are, the looser the IFDI policy will be. When the voter has a weaker economic skill and stronger political skill, the IFDI policy tends to be stricter.