信访制度绩效与上访策略升级

Performance Problem of China's Petition System and Tactical Upgrading of Social Protest

为什么上访人会从正常上访转向"非正常上访"(如缠访、闹访、越级上访、进京上访、"告洋状"和参与群体性事件)?为什么旨在化解矛盾的信访体系反而促使了上访策略升级?基于对S市的案例研究,本文认为,从外部看,信访体系嵌入了一个更强势的维稳权力架构中,信访制度发生了变异,沦为维稳工具;信访部门很难取得职能部门合作,影响了争议解决。从内部看,信访体系对上访人进行分类并采取不同处理措施,办理、回复和跟踪督办不力,信访接待缺乏责任制,领导接访腐蚀了制度公信力。权力结构与组织运作解释了初次上访和重复上访接待质量低下的问题。失望的、富有经验的上访人学会利用"压力型"维稳体制制造的政治机会结构,采取"非正常上访"来达到目的。

Why do petitioners move from normal appealing to ＂non-normal＂ petitioning？ Why does China＇s petition system （or xinfang system）, designed to receive visiting complaints and resolve social conflicts, ironically facilitate ＂non-normal＂ petitioning？ Based on the fieldwork in S municipality, this paper unpacks China＇s petition system along two dimensions., power configuration and organizational dynamics. From an outside view, it is found out that the petition system is embedded in a bigger power structure of maintaining social stability and converted into a state organ that is mainly involved in dealing with ＂non-normal＂ petitioning with normal petitioning largely ignored. The petition system often fails to get effective cooperation from functional departments and is powerless in handling petition matters. From an inside view, it is discovered that there exist flaws in the petition system, including selective handling measures, insufficient follow-up supervisory measures, biased dual-track treatment of different petitioners, absence of responsibility system, and counter-productive leaders＇ intervention. Both power configuration and organizational dynamics of the petition system contribute to the low quality of handling the first- time and repeated petitioners. Desperate and experienced petitioners exploit new opportunities and upgrade their tactics by staging ＂non-normal＂ petitioning. Theoretically, this paper joins the debates on dynamic relations between state response and social protest.