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最低投资规模与企业家福利——基于非对称信息的外部融资分析框架

The Minimum Investment and the Entrepreneur Welfare——Based on the External Financing Analysis Framework of Asymmetric Information
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摘要 最低投资规模是对投资免责市场或私募发行品种的限制。通过运用非对称信息的外部融资分析框架,分析了最低投资规模对均衡利率、企业投资、企业家福利产生的影响。研究结论表明:资本市场的均衡利率随着最低投资规模的提高而降低;资金实力特别弱的企业家没有受到最低投资规模的影响;资金实力弱并处于政策边际的企业家从最低投资规模制度中受到伤害;资金实力强的企业家从最低投资规模制度中得到好处,其净收益增加。 The minimum investment refers to the government restrictions on the investment exemption mar-ket or private placement varieties.Based on the external financing analysis framework of asymmetric informa-tion,the paper analyzes the effects the minimum investment has on the equilibrium interest rate,investment and entrepreneur welfare.The conclusions show that equilibrium interest rate of capital market is scaled down when the minimum investment decreases,that the entrepreneurs whose financial strength are very weak without any shadow ring were not affected by the minimum investment,that entrepreneurs whose financial strength are in the borderline of system were affected by the minimum investment,and that entrepreneurs with strong financial strength benefited from the minimum investment and their net revenue is increased.
出处 《昆明理工大学学报(社会科学版)》 2014年第2期69-75,共7页 Journal of Kunming University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)
基金 云南省自然科学基金项目"机构投资者的策略性交易行为与股价波动"(2011FZ016)
关键词 最低投资规模 信息非对称 均衡利率 企业家福利 the minimum investment asymmetric information equilibrium interest rate entrepreneur welfare
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