期刊文献+

公共项目控制权配置研究 被引量:17

Allocation of Public Project's Control Authority
下载PDF
导出
摘要 运用不完全契约理论、公共选择理论,从项目的公共性、参与方对项目的评价、参与方的投资重要性及参与方的能力四个方面综合探讨了公共项目控制权配置。理论模型分析表明,在投资重要性一致情况下,对于纯公共产品,项目评价指数为控制权分配的决定因素;对于纯私人产品能力是控制权分配的决定因素;对于准公共产品,控制权配置由双方评价指数和能力特征共同决定。最后结合现实的情境,阐述在理论模型框架内如何进行制度安排以达到优化状态。 Topics about proper allocation of control authority in public projects have been researched based on incomplete contract theory and public choice theory by synthetically analyzing four factors of public projects:public nature,participants' evaluation,investment importance,and ability.Previous study shows that participants' evaluation can influence the allocation of control authority in a pure public project and participants' ability can influence the allocation of control authority in a pure private project.Evaluation and ability of participants can influence the allocation of control authority in a quasi-public project.Our theoretical analysis leads to the following policy recommendation:Firstly,with high level of project evaluation,nongovernmental sectors can achieve control rights in the optimal allocation of project' s control authority for pure public projects.In contrast,if the project evaluation level of the non-government sector is low government departments must control public projects in order to prevent market failure.Second,in the case of quasi-public projects and on the condition of participant' s capacities equilibrium,investment importance,level of project evaluation and ability play different role over the ultimate distribution of control authority for quasi-public projects.Non-government sector' s project evaluation and its relative capacity are key factors to determine whether it should control quasi-public project.The results above mean that institutional arrangement of multi-center is reasonable in public projects.Having private partners participate effectively in the public domain can make good use of social resources and reduce the cost of public administration.The government should foster good credit mechanisms of market and build the system of social responsibility to improve private capital's level of public project evaluation.On the other hand,the government should consciously cultivate the capacity of non-governmental sectors.A better system design should consider the ultimate project factors and the transformations of properties,such as time and space.These properties are particularly important for sustainable design,construction,operation and maintenance of large scale infrastructure.Allocation of control authority in construction and maintenance of Chinese rural water conservancy facilities are analyzed using the theoretical framework.
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第2期55-63,共9页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70801066 71071167 71071168) 中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(1009028 1109115)
关键词 公共项目 控制权 不完全契约 公共选择 public project control authority incomplete contract public choice
  • 相关文献

参考文献18

  • 1Klein B. Transaction cost determinants of unfair contractual arrangements [ J ]. American Economic Review, 1980,70 ( 2 ) : 356 - 362.
  • 2埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆.制度激励与可持续发展[M].上海:上海三联书店,2000..
  • 3王茜,万青.准公共物品私人参与供给下的社会收益及政府政策有效性研究[J].经济科学,2009(6):71-78. 被引量:15
  • 4何寿奎,傅鸿源.基于公私伙伴关系的公共项目产权结构与效率分析[J].统计与决策,2007,23(24):74-76. 被引量:2
  • 5KettlDonald.权力共享--公共治理与私人市场[M],北京:北京大学出版社,2009.
  • 6Franeeseoni M, Muthoo A. Control rights in public-private partnerships[ R ]. IZA Discussion Paper 2143,2006.
  • 7王廷惠.公共物品边界的变化与公共物品的私人供给[J].华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版),2007,46(4):36-42. 被引量:22
  • 8Hart O. Finn, contracts and financial structure [ M ]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
  • 9Williamson O E. Transaction and cost economics: The governance of contractual relations[ J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1979, XXII:233 - 261.
  • 10Hart O, Shleifer A, Vishny R W. The proper scope of government: Theory and an application to prisons [ J] Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, 112 (4) : 1127 - 1161.

二级参考文献71

共引文献92

同被引文献188

引证文献17

二级引证文献189

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部