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信息不对称下供应链信息共享激励研究 被引量:6

Research on incentive model of information sharing in supply chains under asymmetric information
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摘要 通常供应链中由于供应双方各自所处环境的不同,各自掌握的信息也不相同,需求信息的不对称对供应链的影响尤为重要.设计了一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链系统,在零售商掌握部分私有需求信息条件下,通过对双方制定决策的博弈过程分析而建立模型,分析得出信息共享的价值和其可能遇到的阻力,最后设计了信息共享的激励模型,提供了实现信息共享的具体方法,模型的分析与建立为研究供应链信息共享激励问题提供了意见与帮助. Typically, the supply chain due to supply different environment in which each of the parties , not the same information at their disposal , the demand of information asymmetry effect on the supply chain is particularly important .This paper designed a system of supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer under the condition of retailers to master some private demand information , through analyzing the game process between both parties making decisions to establish model .Analyzed the value of information sharing and its likely to en-counter resistance , in the final designing the incentive model of information sharing , provides the measures to realize the information sharing , model established and analyzed for the study of supply chain information sharing incentive problems provides advice and help .
出处 《哈尔滨商业大学学报(自然科学版)》 CAS 2014年第2期229-233,共5页 Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Natural Sciences Edition
基金 国家软科学研究计划项目(2013GXS4D115)
关键词 供应链管理 信息共享 博弈论 supply chain management information sharing game theory
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