供应链中碳排放量的非对称信息传递模型

Asymmetric Information Signaling Model of Carbon Emissions in the Supply Chain

对供应链中碳排放量的非对称信息问题,基于一般性假设,构建了博弈模型。在分析信息对称时信号传递模型的基础上,结合Stackelberg博弈模型和激励机制理论,把其扩展到非对称信息时的信息传递模型,求出其次优解并加以分析。针对碳排放量这类产品类型在信息披露时存在的准分离情况进行了分析,给出了约束条件使其分离出真实的产品类型。

Based on the common hypothesis, we construct game model involving signaling asymmetric information of carbon emissions. Then, we extend the symmetry information to asymmetric information, selection contract and find its second-best solution and analyze the result by Stackelberg game model and the theory of incentive mechanism. Analyze the carbon emissions ,which kind of product type that existence of separation in the information disclosure, and give the constraint conditions to the isolated from the real product type.